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"No generation has a freehold on this earth. All we have is a life tenancy-




The nuclear age has been marked by fantastic scientific advances
without corresponding development in humankind's social, political,
or legal capacity to deal with technological problems. 2  The
"solution" to threats such as nuclear war or power plant accidents
has been sought through more and better technology. The nuclear
nations have ,plunged into weapons manufacture and energy
production, putting faith in technology to handle the most predict-
able consequence of such development: the production of vast
quantities of high level nuclear waste (HLW).3 The result of this
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1 The Politics of Posterity, in Costing the Earth: A Survey of the Environment,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989, at Survey 3, Survey 3.
2 See RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 40 (A. Dolman ed. 1976) (prepared
as a report to the Club of Rome with J. Tinbergen serving as coordinator);
TECHNOLOGY AND POLmIcs 4 (M. Kraft & N. Vig eds. 1988); L. WINNER, AUTONO-
MOUS TECHNOLOGY 3 (19'77).
HLW generally includes spent reactor fuel and all other wastes that release
higher specified levels of radioactivity, measured in curies. See International Atomic
Energy Agency, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, INFCIRC/205/Add.1/Rev.1 (1978), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 826 (1979) [hereinafter 1978 IAEA Revised Definition]. For the purposes
of Annex I to the London Dumping Convention, discussed infra notes 38-73 and
accompanying text, the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) has defined
HLW as
any waste or other matter with an activity per unit gross mass (in tonnes)
exceeding:
(a) 1 Ci/t for a-emitters but limited to 10-1 Ci/t for 22 6Ra and supported
216po;
(b) 102 Cit for P/*-emitters with half-lives of at least 0.5 years (excluding
tritium) and P/*-emitters of unknown half-lives; and
(c) 106 Cit for tritium and p/*-emitters with half-lives of less than 0.5
years.
(769)
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approach has been a kind of nuclear shell game. While awaiting
some sort of technological solution, waste has been continually
transferred from one medium or temporary storage facility to
another, creating a shortage of interim capacity and hazardous
conditions.
4
Congress responded to the need for a permanent containment
of HLW by passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA).5
At the time, Congress considered several alternative methods of
waste reduction and isolation. Congress favored mined continental
geologic disposal and eschewed the alternatives, including sub-
seabed disposal (SSD), which involves the emplacement of nuclear
wastes in deep ocean sediment.6 Consequently, the Act's principal
aim became the siting and construction of two terrestrial reposito-
ries by the end of the twentieth century.
The above activity concentrations shall be averaged over a gross mass not
exceeding 1000 tonnes.
Id. at 828.
4 Most of the civilian HLW produced is "sitting in pools of filtered, cooled water
next to the reactors that created them." Wald, Finding a Burial Place for Nuclear
Wastes Grows More Difficul4 N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, at C1, col. 4 [hereinafter Burial
Place]. Nearly 20,000 metric tons of waste awaits disposal, and the total is expected
to rise to 87,000 metric tons by the time existing nuclear plants go off-line. Utilities
are expected to outstrip on-site capacity and may be forced to stop operating when
capacity is reached. Congressional plans for additional temporary storage have been
delayed for further study. See Lippman, Atom-Waste Issue Tossed Back to Hill Wash.
Post, Nov. 2, 1989, at A58, col. 1.
Military wastes pose a more critical problem. Many high level wastes from the
Manhattan project were diluted with water and chemicals and placed at the
Washington State Hanford facility in steel tanks, which eventually leaked. Even newer
double lined steel tanks built in the late 1970s and early 1980s have developed rust
pits, "cast[ing] doubt on the integrity of the approximately 200 tanks at the Hanford
and Savannah River" facilities. Alvarez & Makhijani, Nuclear Waste: The $100-billion
Mess, Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1988, at C3, col. 1. A pilot project designated to accept
certain military wastes has been delayed for years due to engineering problems.
Perhaps most troublesome is the potential for temporarily stored wastes to explode,
as happened in 1957 in Kyshtym, Soviet Union. See Wald, Running Out of Space for
Nuclear Waste, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1989, at E7, col. 1.
5 Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2202 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10,101-26 (1988)).
6 Congress followed the Department of Energy's proposal in selecting deep
geologic disposal. The seabed alternative was rejected because of potential
international political problems, rather than technical reasons. See Eneigy Department
Ordered to Re-examine Ocean Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste, Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 37, at 1996, 1997 (Jan. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Energy Department] (quoting Dick
Nelson, director of the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs for Department of
Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management).
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Implementation of the "solution," however, has been exceeding-
ly difficult, from both a political and a technical standpoint. Siting
of the facilities has been highly contentious, as several states with
potentially suitable geology have mounted fierce opposition to
hosting a permanent facility. After five years of not-in-my-back-yard
(NIMBY) 7 intergovernmental conflict, Congress in 1987 instructed
the United States Department of Energy (DOE) to evaluate the
suitability of Yucca mountain in Nevada and to build the repository
at that site unless an insurmountable problem arose.
8
The DOE has concentrated on deep geologic isolation and the
two billion dollar Yucca suitability investigation. Its narrow focus
has nearly excluded consideration of any other waste disposal
strategy, including SSD. A primary concern has been to avoid
jeopardizing the fragile consensus achieved in selecting the Nevada
site.9 Most recently, however, DOE's single-minded strategy has
7 The NIMBY reaction to siting undesirable activities is a well documented
phenomenon. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theoy, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 442-43 & nn.411-12 (1990) (citing instances of NIMBY
behavior); Glaberson, Coping in the Age of 'Nimby,' N. Y. Times, June 19, 1988, at
Fl, col. 2 (same).
8 See Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101
Stat. 1329-104 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10,172 (1988)).
Some have suggested that sparsely populated Nevada "lost" the siting war as
much due to its relative political impotence as any significant geologic considerations.
Former Sen. Chic Hecht (R., Nev.), the most outspoken critic of the Yucca siting, was
ajunior senator appointed to fill a vacated seat and lacked a technical background,
having been a clothing merchant before becoming a senator. In a public speech,
Senator Hecht mistakenly referred to a HLW facility as a "nuclear suppository."
Reinhold, Nevada Senator's Hope is Revived, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at 30, col. 1.
9 See Civilian Radioactive Waste Disposal: Hearings Before the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 247-49 (1987) (statement of Charles D.
Hollister) [hereinafter Waste Disposal Hearings] (noting that DOE viewed the
subseabed disposal project as competition to the land repository program). Prior to
enactment of the NWPA in 1982, DOE had been conducting considerable research
on seabed emplacement since it was identified by the Carter administration as an
alternative to geologic disposal. See Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: The
Obligation of International Cooperation to Protect the Marine Environmen 21 VA.J. INT'L
L. 621, 642 (1981). DOE abruptly terminated seabed research projects in 1986,
ostensibly for budgetary reasons. See Baker, DOE Funding Cut Puts End to Subseabed
Waste DisposalResearch, NUCLEARFUEL, Dec. 29, 1986, at 7 (quoting a DOE researcher
as saying "they [DOE] feel that the only way they're going to get a [geologic]
repository is if they have no alternatives"). The projects had been conducted out of
the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Office, which also oversees the Yucca
project. See Energy Department supra note 6, at 1996-97. In an effort to preserve
alternatives to deep geologic disposal, Senator Hecht attached a rider to the NWPA
amendments of 1987 that directed DOE to set up an Office of Subseabed Disposal
Research, establish a university-based seabed consortium, and submit progress reports
to Congress. See id. at 1996. The consortium did not form for lack of funds. Despite
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proven to be misguided. Initial DOE testing has revealed significant
problems with the Yucca site, raising doubts concerning its ultimate
viability. The DOE's senior geologist recently recommended that
the site be dropped from consideration because of the threat of
volcanic activity near the mountain, itself a volcanic ash struc-
ture. 10  Further, there are crucial determinations concerning
potential contact with the biosphere which must be made. For
instance, an accurate prediction of changes in the water table for at
least the next 10,000 years is proving difficult if not impossible.
1
The difficulties with this site thus call into question the potential for
any form of permanent deep geologic disposal, and leave the United
States unable to satisfy the NWPA's 1998 completion date for a
permanent disposal option.
Given the uncertainty surrounding terrestrial disposal, there will
surely be renewed interest in options the DOE has previously
forsaken. None of these alternatives promises a realistic solution to
the increasingly urgent problem of high-level waste disposal. At
best, each represents a partial solution, serving as either a secondary
remedy or temporary measure.
Some of the alternatives, such as waste emplacement in polar
caps or ejection into extraterrestrial space, are riskier, costlier, and
more technologically complex than land disposal, and are likely to
be rejected again. 12 Surface storage at either a central facility or
near nuclear reactors as -a final disposal option, while relatively
cheap and simple, has been rejected on social, political, and
environmental grounds.' 3 Reprocessing of nuclear wastes, widely
a DOE promise to reprogram funds from elsewhere for the new office, this was not
done and DOE's budget requests have not included requests for work on subseabed
disposal. See Marshall & Hiruo, U.S. Disinterest in Subseabed Work Could Stymie
International Research, NUcLEARFUEL, Nov. 14, 1988, at 5.
10 See Burial Ple, supra note 4, at C12, col. 4. The senior geologist, John Trapp,
predicted that the site would have serious difficulty passing a Nuclear Regulatory
Commission licensing hearing on the basis of volcanic activity alone. See id.
11 See id. at C12, col. 1-4. The water table below the proposed site inexplicably
rises in one corner. It is also uncertain whether the site will remain a desert
throughout the requisite time period. See id.
12 See Walker, Science and Tecnology of the Sources and Management of Radioactive
Wastes, in Too HOT To HANDLE 61-62 (C. Walker, L. Gould & E. Woodhouse eds.
1983). A variant of surface storage, Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS), calls for
storage of nuclear waste at a central surface repository until a more permanent
facility comes on line. MRS was considered by Congress in 1987 as an amendment
to the NWPA. A blue ribbon commission created by Congress recently recommended
that Congress cancel any plans for an MRS facility and continue the search for a final
disposal option. See Lippman, supra note 4, at A58, col. 1.
15 See D. DEESE, NUCLEAR POWER AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE: A SUB-SEABED
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used in other nuclear nations, has been limited in this country to
military wastes and would face tremendous political opposition if
extended to civilian power generation.
14
Thus, barring discovery of any breakthrough transmutation
process 15 in the next decade, the United States likely will resort to
some form of sea-based disposal in the near future.1 6 The same
result is even more likely for nuclear countries such as Japan and
England, whose size and geology impose tight constraints in siting
a permanent geologic facility. 17 In many respects, SSD seems to
present a highly satisfactory way of dealing with high-level waste:
the vast depth of the water column tends to isolate the radio-
nuclides from human activity; certain ocean plates are among the
most stable geologic formations on earth; and, ocean sediments
bond with radionuclides to immobilize them.'8 In many respects,
however, SSD has the potential to be humankind's most fateful
decision. Similar to the nuclear power and weapon proliferation
that gave rise to the waste disposal problem, SSD is unforgiving of
errors. A miscalculation in planning, design, or execution could
have catastrophic effects, not only for the present generation, but
also for millennia. Careful decision-making now is imperative.
The international order of the ocean environment is presently
in its formative stages. In recent years, there has been a shift away
from the notion that the oceans are "the ultimate 'sink' through
DIsPosAL OPTION? 8 (1978).
14 See Burial Place, supra note 4, at CI, col. 4. Reprocessing involves chemical
treatment of spent fuel to remove its plutonium, an extremely dangerous radioactive
element with a 24,000 year half-life, for use in fueling a reactor. Its atoms are then
split, turning the plutonium into elements with half-lives of only a few hundred years,
and resulting in a product which may be disposed of more safely and easily.
The process has had its most success and is used most commonly in France. See
generally Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 9, at 285-89 (statement of J. Lefevre,
Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique). The United States has not reprocessed spent
fuel because of its high cost and the danger that commerce in plutonium could lead
to weapons proliferation. See Burial Place supra note 4, at CI, col. 4.15 Transmutation would involve "converting the radioactive nuclei of the wastes
to either nonradioactive nuclei or to nuclei with shorter half-lives." Walker, supra
note 12, at 62. While fissile elements like plutonium can already be converted, the
bulk of radioactive waste is not transmutable by any process yet known. See id.
16 See Finn, supra note 9, at 640-41.
17 See id. at 623. While all of the major nuclear nations are investigating deep
geologic disposal, several nations are also actively considering seabed disposal. These
nations include Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. See Cai7 Supports
International Effort on Repositoly Performance Assessmen, NUCLEARFUEL, Apr. 30, 1990,
at 12.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 28-37.
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which we could dispose of all the things too dangerous or unpleas-
ant to store or discard on land." 19 The oceans have come to be
seen as "the common heritage of mankind," and as such, a resource
to be preserved, belonging exclusively to no country.20 SSD does
not fit easily into any of these evolving concepts of ocean use.
Arguably, it is not "pollution" as contemplated by international anti-
dumping accords. In fact, if the technology functions as it should,
SSD prevents the massive pollution that could attend failed land
storage or disposal.
This Comment analyzes the regulatory regime that would affect
any SSD initiative, and it concludes that the present legal order is
inadequate to ensure its safe development and implementation.
Rather than proposing a ban on SSD, this Comment calls for the
establishment of an international regulatory body to oversee its
development and implementation. Part I provides an overview of
the history and technology involved in SSD and explains its risks
and advantages. Part II examines SSD's legality under current and
developing sources of international law, including treaties and
customary law. Part III outlines a proposal to establish an interna-
tional regulatory body to oversee SSD's development and operation.
Part IV concludes that a successful SSD regime could serve as a
precedent for solving several other international environmental
crises.
I. SUBSEABED DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE
A. History
In contrast to most of the other waste disposal options, the
concept of SSD originated in the academic scientific community,
rather than by those in applied engineering or by bureaucratic
sponsorship. 21 As such, much of the technology and underlying
19 RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 2, at 40.
20 SeeThird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened forsignature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS III]; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text
(discussing the common heritage of mankind concept).
21 See E. MILES, K. LEE, & E. CARLIN, NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL UNDER THE
SEABED: ASSESSING THE POLICY ISSUES 23 (1985) [hereinafter E. MILES]. The
academic rather than engineering or bureaucratic roots of the program "created an
ambience in the SSD program radically different from that prevailing elsewhere in the
U.S. radioactive waste effort. The program's principal strengths have been the
disciplined skepticism of anonymous peer review, the inventiveness of academic
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assumptions of SSD are theoretical and largely unverified.2 2 Since
1976, an international Seabed Working Group has worked under
the auspices of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) to determine the
feasibility of SSD.23  The nations represented in the Group
account for more than three quarters of worldwide installed nuclear
capacity. Until 1986, much of the funding had come from the
United States. 24 However, as the U.S. began to focus exclusively
on terrestrial disposal options, funding lapsed. As a result, the
international research slowed substantially, and the initial phase of
the NEA program was terminated three years prematurely.25 The
NWPA amendments of 1987 provided for the formation of a
"university-based Subseabed Consortium" and the Office of
Subseabed Disposal Research within DOE responsible for coordinat-
ing investigation of SSD.26 Neither the Consortium nor the Office
was provided with funding, and the U.S. effort has stagnated.27
B. Technical Aspects
It is important to outline the planned methodology of SSD, as
much of the legal analysis turns on the choice of disposal method.
While complex in practice, SSD centers around a simple idea.
According to the theory of plate tectonics, the most stable geologi-
cal formations on the earth's surface are the centers of the solid
rock plates that constitute the planet's crust.28 Although the edges
of the plates undergo constant collisions with neighboring plates,
entrepreneurs, and a natural inclination toward scientific collaboration across national
boundaries." Id.
22 See id. at 26.
23 See NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, SEABED DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE: A STATUS
REPORT ON THE NEA COORDINATED RESEARCH PROGRAMME 1 (1984) [hereinafter
NEA].
24 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 21.
21 Only 20% of the research was complete at the time the U.S. withdrew funding.
In phase one of the NEA project, an international team of scientists would have used
data from field research to make an initial feasibility assessment by 1990. See Baker,
supra note 9, at 7-8. British, Italian, French, andJapanese research has continued on
a smaller scale. See Marshall & Hiruo, supra note 9, at 5.
26 Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. V, § 5063, 101 Stat. 1330-253 (1987) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 10,204 (1988)). The Subseabed Consortium was to make its first report
assessing SSD as an alternative waste disposal technology to Congress in 1990.
27 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28 See Hollister, A Review of Current Science and TechnologyforDisposal of High-Level
Radioactive Wastes Within Geological Formations of the Deep Seabed in NUCLEAR WASTE
MANAGEMENT: THE OCEAN ALTERNATIVE 58-59 (T. Jackson ed. 1981).
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producing volcanoes, earthquakes, and other violent seismic activity,
their centers remain undisturbed. This stable abyssal area is five to
eleven kilometers below the surface of the ocean and is covered by
a layer of clay sediment, deposited over many millions of years,
which is tens to hundreds of meters thick.2 9 These areas are
"marine deserts," 30 biologically unproductive and far from the
gyres, or currents, flowing near the continental margins.
SSD would use the clays of the deep seabed as a medium for
isolating HLW. The wastes would be rendered in a form that would
delay dispersal within the sediment, packed into ballistic shaped
metal "penetrometers" and transported by ship to the dump site.
At the site, the containers would either be allowed to free fall into
the ocean sediment, be propelled into place by an engine, or be
placed into pre-drilled holes and capped.31 The last option would
allow for easier retrieval should a problem develop with deployment
or long-term disposal.
Exposed to the corrosive effects of salt water, the metal canister
can be expected to last only for decades or perhaps centuries-
merely a fraction of the time necessary for safe isolation. 32 After
the primary waste barrier is breached, however, research shows that
the surrounding seabed clay tends to immobilize or "sorb" ions
found in radioactive wastes, trapping the radionuclides in place.
33
Because of the plastic-like properties of the clay, the hole that the
emplacement creates would seal itself.3 4 The deep sea clay is also
highly impermeable, meaning that fluids travel through it extremely
slowly.35 As a tertiary barrier, the vast water column would dilute
29 See id.
30 See id. at 59.
31 See NEA, supra note 23, al. 107; Silva, Physical Processes in Deep-Sea Clays, 20
OcEANuS 31, 36-37 (1977).
32 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 28. There are varying estimates of the requisite
isolation time. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment concluded that it would
take about one million years for high-level waste from reprocessing 15-year-old spent
fuel to fall below the toxicity of the original uranium ore. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLO-
GY ASSESSMENT, MANAGING THE NATION'S COMMERCIAL HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
WASTE 29-30 (1985).
33 See D. DEESE, supra note 13, at 12 (stating that "[p]reliminary results suggest
that about 1,000 to 10,000 times as much of the [radioactive] elements will be
attached to sediment particles as are dissolved in adjacent pore water").
-4 See NEA, supra note 23, at 117-18. Laboratory tests indicate that closure of a
hole from a penetrating projectile would be immediate and total, whereas that of a
hole left open by drilled emplacement would be gradual. See D. DEESE, supra note
13, at 13.
35 See Hollister, supra note 213, at 62. Furthermore, the high heat (up to 250*
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any escaped radionuclides, but planners view such contact with the
biosphere as unacceptable isolation of the Wastes. 
6
Because of the unique conditions that the insertion of wastes in
the sea floor presents, the technology would have to be tested
extensively in situ, rather than on the blackboard, before its merits
can be fully assessed. 7 Even so, certain advantages and risks are
already apparent.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Both treaty law and customary international law impose general
international obligations upon states to protect the marine environ-
ment. The most important obligations in the SSD context derive
from both the London Dumping Convention (LDC)38 and the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III).Sg
A. The London Dumping Convention: "Dumping"
The LDC of 1972, in force for fifty-six state parties including the
United States, 40 is a global attempt 1 to ban or limit the dumping
of specified pollutants into the marine environment. 42 Its terms
prohibit the dumping of all substances listed in Annex I of the
Convention, the "black list" of pollutants. Annex II, the "grey list,"
catalogs a group of pollutants that may only be dumped subject to
celsius) of the wastes would not create convection currents in the sediment due to the
tremendous pressure at depth, which prevents water from boiling. See E. MILES, supra
note 21, at 25.
36 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 28. This approach sharply contrasts with
disposal of low level wastes, where dilution and dispersal with sea water is a primary
objective.37 See D. DEESE, supra note 13, at 12 (enumerating unanswered empirical questions
concerning the feasibility of SSD).
"8 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 [hereinafter London
Dumping Convention].
" See UNCLOS III, supra note 20.
40 See Moore, Considering an International Subseabed Waste Repositoy: Rational
Choice and Community Interes4 WASH. Q., Summer 1986, at 115, 119.
41 Article III (3) of the LDC defines "sea" as including "all marine waters other
than the internal waters of States." London Dumping Convention, supra note 38, at
2407.
42 See Curtis, Legality of Seabed Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes Under the
London Dumping Convention, 14 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 383, 393. (1985) (stating that
"[t]he basic philosophy of the LDC is that the nations of the world will work together
to ensure that the marine environment becomes safe from the dangers of dumping").
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the issuance of a prior permit by the flag state; all other dumping
only requires the issuance of a prior general permit.4 High-level
radioactive waste was classified as an Annex I pollutant, entirely
banned from dumping tinder the LDC.4 4 The IAEA was charged
with formulating the definitional distinctions between high and low
level wastes. 45  1
The question of whether SSD comes within the LDC's regulatory
scheme turns on whether seabed emplacement of sealed canisters
containing banned wastes constitutes "dumping" within article III
l(a); it defines the term s: "any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes
or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea." 46  The interpretation of the definition has
proved to be an intensely divisive one for the contracting parties,
and has engendered a substantial amount of academic commentary.
Upon the language of the definition, two possible constructions
are possible. First, "disposal at sea"47 can be construed to refer
only to the location of the dumping structure at the time of the
dumping, independent of whether the material ever reaches the sea
or not. The focus in this view is on the physical location of the
dumping mechanism. 48 Since SSD calls for delivery of the waste-
43 See Letalik, Pollutionfrom Dumping in D.JOHNSTON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
OF THE SEA 223 (1981). Annex III sets out factors that states are obliged to "carefully
consider" in issuing permits.
44 See London Dumping Convention, supra note 38, at 2465 (defining Annex 1
pollutants as "[h]igh-level radio-active wastes... defined on public health, biological
or other grounds by the competent international body in this field, at present the
International Atomic Energy Agency, as unsuitable for dumping").
45 See 1978 IAEA Revised Definition, supra note 3. An Annex to this definition
clarifies that deep disposal into the ocean comes within the terms of the definition:
The Definition identifies material, the radioactive content of which
is at such a level that the Parties. . . would wish to prevent any
participating State from issuing a special permit even after a
detailed appraisal of the safety of the proposed operation, and
even for the sector of the marine environment furthest removed
from man, i.e. the deep sea with depth greater than 4000 met[er]s.
Id. at 840 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
46 London Dumping Convention, supra note 38, at 2407.
47 The meaning of "sea" is set out in the LDC, and is not a matter of contention.
See supra note 41. Wastes stored in the seabed in isolation from ocean waters quite
clearly are not in the "sea." A different result would obtain for any SSD method that
depended on dilution and dispersion in ocean waters once the primary sediment
barrier is breached.
48 Thus, under this conceptualization, "[e]ven the firing into space of rockets
carrying waste would be covered ... provid[ed] the action started from a ship or
similar structure outside the territorial waters of a State." Welsch, The London
Dumping Convention and Sub-Seabed Disposal of Radioactive Waste, 28 GERMAN Y.B. OF
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bearing penetrometers from a vessel or platform based at sea, the
LDC's article IV and Annex I would impose a complete ban upon
the activity.4 9  Proponents of this construction point to the
overriding purpose50 of the LDC that "permeate[s] the preamble,
articles, and annexes of the LDC," which emphasizes.the intercon-
nected nature of the marine environment. 51 Further support for
this construction can be found in the LDC's successful ban on ocean
incineration, which seems to have been based on a location-at-sea
definition.
5 2
A second interpretation of article III focuses on the final resting
place of the dumped material. A strong argument can be made that
the repetition of the words "at sea" should be dispositive: since the
second "at sea" refers unambiguously to the location of the
dumping vehicle, the first "at sea" cannot also refer to the same
thing; such a construction would be senselessly redundant.
53
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the context
of the provision should be accorded primary importance; a more
reasonable interpretation that gives ordinary meaning to each of the
terms of the agreement is preferred unless it can be established that
the parties intended otherwise. 54  Several commentators have
INT'L L. 322, 326 (1985). Of course, wastes delivered to the seabed via a land-based
tunnel should not fall within this interpretation of dumping. Sweden has implement-
ed such a plan. See id. at 327.49 LDC article IV provides in pertinent part: "In accordance with the provisions
of this Convention Contracting Parties shall prohibit the dumping of any wastes or
other matter in whatever form or condition except as otherwise specified below: (a)
the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex I is prohibited." London
Dumping Convention, supra note 38, at 2408. For a description of Annex I wastes,
see supra note 44.
50 See Curtis, supra note 42, at 393.
51 Id. at 398. Curtis argues:
[T]he only harmonious and reasonable interpretation of "disposal at sea" is
that which defines such disposal to mean the place where the dumping
activities occur.... An interpretation which seeks to exempt seabed
disposal from the LDC by... refer[ring] only to the "final resting place"
... directly conflicts with the Contracting Parties' broadly stated responsi-
bilities to protect the marine environment from pollution caused by
dumping. Any distinction between marine waters and the seabed and
subsoil... should be treated as artificial and inappropriate; wastes disposed
of in the seabed are part of the marine environment.
Id. 52 See, e.g., Statement by the Norwegian Delegation to the Seventh Consultative Meeting
LDC 7/INF.22 (Feb. 17, 1983), quoted in Curtis, supra note 42, at 396.
53 See Curtis, supra note 42, at 396 (discussing the presence of redundancy within
the four treaty languages); Moore, supra note 40, at 129 (noting that a "strictly textual
analysis... strongly supports an interpretation that [SSD] is not prohibited per se").
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969.
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attempted to resolve the controversy by comparing translations of
the three other official language texts, and have reached varying
conclusions. 55 Thus, a facial reading of the definition of dumping
yields no clear result.
56
The contracting parties first attempted to resolve the ambiguity
at the Seventh Consultative Meeting in February 1983, with
inconclusive results. Norway raised the issue in light of the NEA
Seabed Working Group's activities, and the parties resolved to call
an intercessional meeting of legal experts to consider whether SSD
fell within the scope of LDC.57 The experts were unable to reach
agreement, but produced three draft resolutions.
At one extreme, the "Nordic" draft would have banned SSD
outright unless a "future technical development" is proven to
"secure the isolation [of HLW] from the biosphere."5 8  At the
other extreme, the draft of the United Kingdom and France would
have concluded that SSD falls outside of the LDC because it was
unknown at the conclusion of the 1972 Convention. 59 The United
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM.J. INT'L L. 875, 885 (1969). Article
31 of that agreement provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose." Id. Moore notes that "[t]he Vienna
Convention... is generally recognized today as the starting point in international law
for the interpretation of agreements. Although the United States is not yet a party
to that convention, it recognizes its provisions as customary international law."
Moore, supra note 40, at 128.
55 For example, Curtis explains that
[i]n the French text, "imm~rsion" (dumping) means "in the sea"; in Spanish,
"vertimiento" means "in the sea"; and in Russian "Copoc" means "in the
sea" or "into the sea." Thus, support for defining "at sea" to be the place
where the disposal activities occur, in contradistinction to "in the sea," i.e.,
the final position of the wastes, is based in part on [which] authentic text
* ..is used.
Curtis, supra note 42, at 396; see also Moore, supra note 40, at 129 (arguing that the
more plausible reconciliation of the English version with the clear meaning of the
other three languages is to adopt "the version that makes all three consistent with no
changes in meaning in any language-that is, reference to final position of the
materials disposed rather than location of the disposing vessel-should be preferred");
Welsch, supra note 48, at 325 (noting that the Spanish and English texts yield the
same ambiguity, while the French text clearly means "disposal into the sea").
56 See Welsch, supra note 48, at 327 (concluding after literal and contextual
analysis that "[b]oth solutions appear possible").
57 See Curtis, supra note 42, app. at 404 (text of resolution 15(7)).
5 8 Welsh, supra note 48, at 338. Spain and Greenpeace International adopted a
more radical position, arguing that SSD was per se prohibited by the Convention.
Their efforts did not yield a draft resolution considered at the Eighth Consultative
Meeting. See Moore, supra note 40, at 119-20.
59 See Welsch, supra note 48, at 338-39.
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States and West Germany adopted a middle position. They
proposed that any method of SSD that did not harm the environ-
ment would be acceptable and that any future regulation should be
based on "the specific technology applied."60 In the end, the
participants could not agree on a joint statement, and they
concluded only that the LDC "is the appropriate international
forum to address the question of [SSD]." 61 After considerable
debate on these positions, the Eighth Consultative Meeting of 1984
itself could not reach consensus on the legal issue, and only
seconded the experts' jurisdictional conclusion.
62
There was little substantive discussion of the issue until the
Thirteenth Consultative Meeting in November of 1990.63 At this
most recent Meeting, the contracting parties approved a proposal
by Spain (the Spanish Resolution) providing that "[d]isposal of low-
level radioactive wastes into sub-sea-bed repositories accessed from the
sea constitutes a form of disposal.., and is therefore suspended at
present."64 The Resolution clearly endorses the disposal vehicle
interpretation 65 of the article III 1(a) definition of "dumping."
While its terms apply only to low-level waste, the Spanish Resolution
impacts upon subseabed disposal of HLW as well. As noted, HLW
has been classified as an Annex I pollutant, banned from "dumping"
under the LDC.66 Thus, the new interpretation of "dumping"
would also impose a ban on subseabed disposal of such waste.
67
60 Moore, supra note 40, at 120.
61 Welsch, supra note 48, at 339.
62 See Moore, supra note 40, at 120. The only addition was the following
statement:
[N]o such disposal should take place unless and until it is proved to be
technically feasible and environmentally acceptable, including a determina-
tion that such wastes and matter can be effectively isolated from the marine
environment, and a regulatory mechanism is elaborated under the [LDC] to
govern the disposal into the sea-bed of such radioactive wastes and matter.
Id.
6s The only further action by the LDC potentially relevant to seabed emplacement
issues was a 1989 decision to ban the scuttling of decommissioned nuclear submarines
at sea. Over British protests, the LDC agreed that submarines do come within its
1983 moratorium on disposing of nuclear waste at sea. See Sub Dump Baned,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, Nov. 23, 1989, at 16.
64 Resolution LDC.41(13), Disposal of Radioactive Wastes into Sub-Sea-Bed
Repositories Accessed From the Sea (1990) [hereinafter Spanish Resolution]
(emphasis added) (on file with the author).
ME See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
66 See supra text accompanying note 44.
67 See Spanish Resolution, supra note 64. The second proviso envisions this result
when it states in relevant part, "R[ecalling] that high-level radioaictive wastes are listed
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It is important to note that the major nuclear nations-the United
States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union-voted against the
proposal; Japan and three other nations abstained.68 The nuclear
powers consider the Resolution non-binding, but indicated that they
would comply voluntarily.69
Thus, after polarized negotiations, divisive voting, and much
scholarship 70 on the issue, the legal question appears to have been
answered. This history raises doubts as to whether the LDC is the
appropriate forum to regulate SSD. The parties' focus on the
technical legal challenge to the exclusion of any substantive analysis
of SSD-and failure to reach a consensus-is immediately striking.
One observer has likened this narrow preoccupation with "disem-
bodied texts" apart from the merits of the issue as "the kind of legal
excess rightly condemned by Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist
.... "71 Politics appears to have prevailed over scientific inquiry;
it is instructive to note that the Convention deferred to legal experts
rather than scientists in evaluating SSD.
Such an a priori regulatory approach necessarily fails to relate
SSD to the larger waste disposal context. Any complete evaluation
should proceed from the realization that the world's high-level
wastes, already produced and awaiting permanent disposal in
surface pools, must inevitably be disposed of in some mediium.
Waste disposal will likely be reduced to a choice between lesser
under Annex I to the London Dumping Convention, and therefore cannot be
dumped at sea .... " Id.
See Rubin, Industrial Powers Agree To Ban Ocean Dumping of Wastes, Associated
Press Wire Service, Nov. 2, 1990.
69 See id. A British delegate to the Meeting made a statement after the vote that
typified nuclear nation reaction to the voluntary moratorium: "[Y]oujust can't wish
it away, we have to put [the radioactive waste] somewhere. We have no plans to
dump radioactive waste, but we are not prepared to eliminate options that we may
later regret." Id.
70 For salient examples of the scholarship engendered by the question, compare
Welsch, supra note 48, with Curtis, supra note 42. Both authors exhaustively analyze
SSD's legality under the LDC, using the Vienna Convention as their basis for
interpreting the text, yet reach opposite conclusions. Both authors focused on the
same sources of interpretation, inter alia: context, plain meaning, legislative history,
subsequent actions of the parties, and other official texts. Welsch ultimately
concludes that "the disposal of radioactive wastes into the seabed in isolation from
the biosphere does not come within the scope of the LDC." Welsch, supra note 48,
at 353. However, Curtis concludes that this interpretation, as Article 32(b) of the
Vienna Convention states, "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreason-
able." Curtis, supra note 42, at 398. Curtis's reasoning has previously been detailed.
See supra note 55.
71 Moore, supra note 40, at 116.
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evils, and the seabed may be the most environmentally sound
location to store the wastes. Furthermore, waste disposal is
inextricably linked to a myriad of other considerations besides
ocean pollution. The LDC's aspiration to protect the oceans from
environmental degradation is a noble one, but may make it an
inappropriate organization to determine nuclear waste strategy. For
example, it is beyond the scope of the Convention to consider such
important "nonenvironmental community interests" as nuclear
nonproliferation policy or developmental assistance for the third
world.
72
The LDG is not the detached and objective entity that could
ultimately regulate the complex operational aspects of SSD. At the
projected rate of spent nuclear fuel generation, by the year 2000,
emplacement will have to take place at a rate of one waste penetro-
meter per hour, 24 hours per day, 365 days a year in order to
dispose of the waste adequately. 73 There will be no opportunity
for trial and error. Clearly, the oversight of such an operation will
require engineering and technical skills. At present, there is no
precedent for an international organization with the enforcement
powers and know-how to manage SSD. The LDG, with its excep-
tionally political and narrowly legal focus, will not be the appropri-
ate body to oversee implementation of SSD.
B. The Third Conference on the Law of The Sea
In the year following completion of the LDC, negotiations began
on what was to result in the largest and most comprehensive
multilateral agreement concluded by states: the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. To date, UNCLOS III
has been signed by 155 countries and ratified by 42; 74 60 countries
72 Id. at 121. Professor Moore argues that an international subseabed repository
would substantially simplify the monitoring of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle,
helping to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. See id. at 123. SSD
would also allow developing countries "to participate fully in civilian nuclear power
development." Id. at 125. While operation of nuclear power plants might be within
the capabilities of such nations, waste disposal presents a problem that even the most
technologically advanced nations have been unable to solve. Poorer nations with
existing nuclear facilities will find it difficult to engineer and build a multi-billion
dollar waste repository and might be tempted to engage in unsafe disposal practices.
See id.
73 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 27.
74 See TrainingProgrammeforEnterprise to Be in Place by 1991, UN CHRONICL,June
1990, at 38, 39.
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must ratify the treaty to bring it into force.75 A number of states
crucial to the success of UNGLOS III, including the United States,
have refused to sign or ratify the document, largely due to the deep
seabed resource provisions of the agreement.76 UNGLOS III set
out to establish a kind of constitution for the oceans. Its primary
focus is an accommodation between the economic interests of
coastal states in their own waters and the interests of the interna-
tional community in safeguarding the rights of free navigation. The
most significant parts of the Convention in the SSD context are
those pertaining to establishment of a seabed regime for extracting
resources and protecting the marine environment. Although SSD
is not specifically addressed under UNGLOS III, its provisions are
highly relevant to SSD's legality and eventual operation.
1. The International Seabed Authority and "Appropriation" Issues
UNGLOS III's most unique and controversial provisions relate
to the establishment of an International Seabed Authority (ISA) to
govern the mining of deep seabed manganese nodules and other
minerals. Declaring these resources to be "the common heritage of
mankind," 77 the convention states that "[n]o State shall claim or
75 See UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 308(1).
76 For a comprehensive statement and defense of the U.S. position, see Malone,
The United States and the Law of the Sea After UNCLOS III, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1983, at 29 (1983). Mr. Malone, chair of the U.S. Delegation to the
Conference, argues that the nonseabed provisions of UNCLOS III, including the
marine protection provisions, merely codify existing customary law. See id. at 33. He
argues that the objectionable deep seabed mining provisions would create a "socialist"
order by establishing the International Seabed Authority, a bureaucracy that would
govern resource extraction of the areas beyond national jurisdiction, and mandate
income and technology transfer to lesser developed nations. Id. at 31-32. See also
President's Statement, U.S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 416, at 1-2 (July-
Aug. 1982) (noting U.S. objections to the seabed regime).
There has been substantial commentary on the advisability of and prospects for
U.S. ratification ofUNCLOS III. See e.g., Clingan, The United States and the Law of the
Sea Conference, in THE NEW ORDER OF THE OCEANS: THE ADVENT OF A MANAGED
ENVIRONMENT 219, 234-37 (G. Pontecorvo ed. 1986) [hereinafter Pontecorvo].
President Bush has signaled no departure from the original U.S. position, and has
refused even to send an observer to Preparatory Commission negotiations currently
underway. See A Bigger Sea Around Us, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1990, at A26, col. 1;
HearingoftheSenateForeign Relations Committee, Sept. 20,1990 (LEXIS, NEXIS library,
Fednew file) (testimony ofThomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations)
(explaining the Bush Administration's refusal to take part in PrepCom negotiations).77 UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 136. This doctrine derives from Arvid Prado,
an Italian Ambassador to the United Nations, and was first applied to the seabed in
the U.N. Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and
the Subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction in 1970. Its precise
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exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or
its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person
appropriate any part thereof."7 "The Area" is defined broadly to
include "the seabed and the ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction."
79
Since the ISA governs activities occurring within the broad
expanse of "the Area," SSD would appear to fall within activities
regulated by the its jurisdiction. It would certainly take place in the
Area, and theoretically has the potential for being a prohibited
"appropriation" of the seabed. There are, however, two difficulties
with this reasoning.
First, the convention defines "activities in the Area" to be "all
activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the
Area."80 Given the definition of "resources" in article 133(a) as
"all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at
or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules," the ISA's
jurisdiction seems confined to mineral extraction. Although it may
be argued that the seabed itself is a "resource," which SSD exploits,
the argument is strained.8 1 The convention was well aware of the
SSD option at the time the seabed regime was negotiated, 2 yet
meaning is a matter of controversy, but generally it is understood as the theoretical
underpinning for rejecting both the res nullius (subject to national appropriation) and
the res communis (not subject to appropriation, but open to access and use by all)
concepts of the seabed ownership. Rather, exploitation of the "common heritage"
should benefit all mankind and be shared equitably. The ISA's ostensible mandate
is to realize this last goal. See Schachter, Concepts and Realities in the New Law of the
Sea, in Pontecorvo, supra note 76, at 27, 51-53.
78 UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 137(1).79 id. art. 1(1).
80 Id. art. 1(3).
81 When presented with this argument during a symposium on SSD, Elliot
Richardson, a U.S. Ambassador to UNCLOS III responded:
I don't believe the [ISA] could [assert jurisdiction over SSD] because its
jurisdiction would be limited to the control and management of the
exploration of deep seabed resources. The exploitable resources of the
deep seabed would come within its jurisdiction as distinguished from the
resources of the water column above the seabed.... The Authority could
apply and enforce ... standards as against a company involved in deep
seabed mining, even to the point of forcing the company to stop a mining
operation because of new evidence that its activity was significantly
destructive of the marine environment.... [Ilt doesn't follow that an
authority set up only to manage the exploitation of seabed resources and to
protect the marine environment from the consequence of such exploitation
could protect the seabed generally.
Richardson, Sub-Seabed Disposal in the Context of the Law of the Sea, in NUCLEAR WASTE
MANAGEMENT: THE OCEAN ALTERNATIVE, supra note 28, at 87-88.82 SSD first gained recognition in the scientific community in 1973. Delegates to
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defined the scope of the ISA in terms that particularly describe
mining operations. Moreover, while the drafters meticulously
delineated the operational aspects of a mining regime, including
provisions for "pioneer investors" and an "Enterprise," these
sections are silent on any regime that could manage SSD. 83
Second, it is not clear that seabed emplacement would constitute
an exercise of sovereignty or appropriation prohibited by article
137(a). SSD might better be considered a reasonable "use," rather
than an attempt to appropriate.8 4 According to one estimate, the
area occupied by a repository would amount to a loss of only
0.0005% in area available for mining operations. 8 5 SSD sites could
be located away from potential mineral recovery areas; depending
on the eventual form of SSD, there is even the possibility that
mineral resources on the sea floor or shallow sediment could be
recovered without endangering the repository. 86  Thus, it is
difficult to conclude that SSD interferes with UNCLOS III's seabed
regime, or its basis in the "common heritage of mankind."
At most, UNGLOS I[ requires consultation with the ISA
concerning emplacement activities. Article 147(3) imposes the
obligation that "[o]ther activities in the marine environment shall be
conducted with reasonable regard for activities in the Area." In
addition, article 145 gives the ISA broad rulemaking powers to
protect the marine environment from the harmful effects of drilling,
construction, excavation, and the like in the Area.8 7 UNCLOS III
UNCLOS III were aware that SSD was being debated in "other forums," and did not
consider the subject during the negotiations. See id. at 85-86.
83 See UNCLOS III, supra note 20, arts. 150-53 & resolution II.
84 There are "uses" of the sea floor that are considered freedoms of the high seas.
For example, article 87(1)(c) includes the "freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines" together with the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, and
fishing. These freedoms are essentially those recognized in 1958 by article 2 of
UNCLOS I. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. Although submarine cables might be considered a
physical appropriation of a part of the sea floor, they are not considered as such
under international law. Instead they constitute a reasonable use of the sea floor.
85 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 79-80 (quoting Hinga, The Conflicts Between
Deep Ocean Mining and Subseabed Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (Sandia Nat'l
Laboratories, Report No. SAND81-1486J) (unpublished manuscript)).
86 See Finn, supra note 9, at 682.
87 For instance, UNCLOS III provides that
the Authority shall adopt appropriate rules ... for inter alia:
(a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution.., from harmful
effects of such activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of waste,
construction and operation or maintenance or installations ....
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would obligate nations to ensure that the operational aspects of SSD
do not unreasonably restrict mineral recovery or harm the marine
environment.
To a large extent, friction between the ISA and SSD regimes
would only come about if UNCLOS III comes into force without the
ratification of the major nuclear nations. A prevailing theme of the
deep sea mining negotiations was the demand of developing nations
to share in the wealth and technology of seabed resource recov-
ery.8 The Group of 77, a bloc of less developed countries, rallied
behind the common heritage of mankind concept, and viewed the
seabed mining regime as an opportunity to establish a New Interna-
tional Economic Order. 89 The Group encountered fierce resis-
tance from developed nations, which have refused to sign or ratify
UNCLOS III because of its objectionable "socialist" redistribution
and regulation provisions. 90 If the major nuclear nations do not
support UNCLOS III, there will be a greater tension between seabed
emplacement and ISAjurisdiction. Just as the Group of 77 does not
necessarily have a single opinion of nuclear power, there is no
unified front on SSD.91 Many third world nations view nuclear
power as a key to development, and would depend on an interna-
tional repository to dispose of their nuclear waste.92 If developed
non-signatories proceed with emplacement outside of the ISA, SSD
would tend to be unnecessarily cast into a developed/less developed
"appropriation" issue.
(b) the protection and conservation of the natural resources of the Area and
the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine environment.
UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 145. From the context of its usage here, the term
"disposal of waste" seems to point dearly to wastes generated in resource recovery.
8 The developing nations' influence has been well documented. See, e.g., Beesley,
The NegotiatingStrateg of UNCLOS III: Developing and Developed Countries as Partners-
A Pattern for Future Multilateral International Conferences?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1983, at 183, 185-93 (documenting North/South interactions during the
negotiation of UNCLOS III).
" For a detailed analysis of the New International Economic Order, see ROLSON,
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: NEGOTIATING
GLOBAL PROBLEMS, 1974-1981 (1981).
" See, e.g., Malone, supra note 76, at31 (noting the objections of the United States
to UNCLOS III).
91 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 76.
92 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also D. DEESE, supra note 13, at
151 (noting ambivalent attitudes of lesser developed nations toward waste disposal in
the global commons).
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2. Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment
UNCLOS III delineates the rights and duty of all States to
protect and preserve the marine environment. Its articles are
intended to establish constitutionally the importance of safeguard-
ing the oceans: they prescribe broad norms of State behavior as to
both dumping and control of marine pollution.
93
UNCLOS III adopts the LDC's definition of dumping9 4 verba-
tim, with one crucial diffe:rence: the first ambiguous reference to
"at sea" in the LDC's definition is deleted. "Dumping" is defined
as "any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea."95 The
language leaves no doubt that the definition of dumping depends
not on the final resting place of the wastes, but rather the location
of the dumping vehicle. SSD would clearly be considered dumping
under UNGLOS III, which puts an obligation on States to "take...
all measures ... necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment from any source . "..."96 Such mea-
sures must "minimize to the fullest extent possible ... the release
of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are
persistent ... from or through the atmosphere or by dumping."
9 7
Radioactive wastes, if released into the biosphere, are unequivocally
"pollution,"9 8 and are the most persistent wastes known to man-
kind. As a result, States under the convention appear to have an
affirmative duty to prohibit SSD unless it can be shown that
9s See UNCLOS III, supra note 20, arts. 192-96.
94 See supra text accompanying note 46.
95 UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 1(5)(a)(i).
96 Id. art. 194(1).
97 Id. art. 194(3)(a) (emphasis added).
98 See id. art. 1(4). The Convention adopts the broadest definition of "pollution"
found in international law. See Tomczak, The Definitions of Marine Pollution: A
Comparison of Definitions Used by International Conventions, 8 MARINE POL'Y 311, 322
(1984). It is defined as:
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment ... which results or is likely to result in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance of marine activities, including fishing and other
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and
reduction of amenities.
UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 1(4). Thus, seabed emplacement of sealed
penetrometers that may eventually breach the sediment layer might be considered
"pollution," even if there is only some undefined probability that the event will occur.
The risk of breach will have to be viewed under the "likely to result" standard set out
in the definition.
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radionuclides will not escape sedimentary isolation and enter the
environment. UNCLOS III thus appears to clarify and extend the
LDC's requirements, pioneering more protective provisions.
The foregoing obligation, however, might be substantively the
same as that mandated by the LDC. In large measure, UNCLOS III
delegates the actual business of regulation and standard-setting to
"competent international organizations" such as the LDC, with
enforcement left to coastal or flag states.99 This tends to create a
"facing mirrors" problem: both the LDC and UNCLOS III look to
each other for guidance in dealing with seabed emplacement issues.
The LDC in theory should find its mandate in UNCLOS III's
provisions. Those provisions do not come into play unless the LDC
determines that "enforcement" is necessary when viewed against
those same UNCLOS III provisions. In practical effect, this means
that the very same finding of environmental risk that would bring
emplacement under the LDC would also bring it under UNCLOS
III. Conversely, if it were determined that no environmental risk
were posed by SSD, neither international agreement would
apply.100  Thus, in the emplacement context, UNCLOS III's
dumping provisions are more like declarations of broad principle
rather than enforceable obligations on states. The Convention's
dumping articles are important and relevant to the SSD debate, but
are more hortatory than binding.
Some nations, including the United States, view the convention's
marine protection provisions as merely codifying customary
international law.101 The chair of the U.S. delegation to the
conference, James L. Malone, asserts that "[f]or the marine
99 As far as enforcement with respect to pollution by dumping, UNCLOS III
provides that
[l]aws and regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention and
applicable international rules and standards established through competent
international organizations or diplomatic conference for the prevention,
reduction and control of pollution of the maritime environment by dumping
shall be enforced:
a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or
its exclusive economic zone or onto its continental shelf;
b) by the flag State with regard to vessels flying its flag or vessels or aircraft
of its registry;
c) by any State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other matter
occurring within its territory or at its off-shore terminals.
UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 216(1).
100 See Richardson, supra note 81, at 85-86.
101 See Malone, supra note 76, at 29; Schachter, supra note 77, at 40.
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environment, the Convention is unnecessary. Existing international
conventions provide adequate standards restricting the discharge of
pollutants . . .. 102 Under this conception of UNCLOS III, the
treaty creates no additional obligations. The rights and duties of
both signatories and nonparties to the agreement remain un-
changed.
3. Failure of UNCLOS III to Resolve Emplacement Issues
Given the foregoing analysis, UNCLOS III ultimately holds little
promise as a control on the development and implementation of
seabed emplacement. The ISA's jurisdiction is not likely to extend
to SSD. A challenge based on an "appropriation" claim is also likely
to prove unavailing. The controversy over whether UNGLOS III
actually creates any new environmental protection obligations
undermines any claim that it in and of itself makes SSD illegal.
In addition, UNCLOS III's applicability must turn on evaluations
of technology, rather than a priori legal reasoning. As noted, the
negotiating states knew of the emplacement option, but chose
neither to ban nor to sanction it.103 It would be inappropriate to
read into the language, ex post facto, an intent to do either.
Narrow legal interpretation of UNCLOS III, apart from a consider-
ation of the option's merits, suffers from the same problematic
focus as has characterized the LDC's consideration of the issue.
10 4
Further, both agreements fail to provide adequate mechanisms to
conduct the requisite initial scientific evaluations and regulate the
operational aspects of seabed emplacement.
C. Customary International Law
Customary international law105 represents a final potential
restraint on SSD, although determining the precise contours of such
limitation is difficult. Neither SSD nor any similarly hazardous
subseabed activity has ever been undertaken, and there are no
unequivocal state practices demonstrating the requisite material act
102 Malone, supra note 76, at 36.
103 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
105 Customary law has been described as "any recurring mode of interaction
among individuals and groups, together with the more or less explicit acknowledg-
ment by these groups and individuals that such patterns of interaction produce
reciprocal expectations of conduct that ought to be satisfied." R. UNGER, LAW IN
MODERN SOcIETY 49 (1976).
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and opinio juris.106 However, there are several accepted norms of
state behavior that will impact on SSD.
In contrast to a previous international presumption that
pollution of the ocean beyond national jurisdiction was legal unless
affirmatively prohibited by treaty,10 7 the current rule is founded
upon the notion that all uses of the high seas must be exercised
"with due regard for the interests of other States."1 08 According-
ly, states have an obligation to determine whether a proposed use
of the ocean, undertaken under authority of a high seas free-
dom,10 9 is "reasonable" before proceeding. °1 0 McDougal and
Burke, commentators who have done much to elaborate upon this
international law requirement, have noted the following criteria to
evaluate the reasonableness of a proposed waste disposal plan:
Factors relevant to an assessment for this purpose would include
the scope and intensity of prior investigation of a proposed site,
the possibility of harm according to existing information, prior use
of the area, effects on such prior use and on potential uses, and
available alternatives for the disposing state.
111
Applied to SSD, this test yields ambiguous results. Emplacement
will only be reasonable if it is safe "according to existing informa-
tion," the disposing state essentially has no other viable options, and
the relative importance of competing uses is low. Yet, the major
difficulty in evaluating any HLW disposal plan exactly is the inability
to assess each of these variables. Most importantly, it is difficult to
106 In order to establish a rule of customary international law, it is not enough
merely to demonstrate that a state or group of states has acted in a particular way.
There must also be a showing that the relevant participants thought of themselves as
bound to act in the way they did, for other than moral or political reasons. See M.
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (2d ed. 1986) ("The opiniojuris, or belief that a state
activity is legally obligatory, is the factor which turns the usage into a custom and
renders it part of the rules of international law."); see also Haimbaugh, Protecting the
Seasfrom NudearPollution, 33 S.C.L. REV. 197,222 (1981) ("In the few decades during
which nations have faced problems of handling and disposing of radioactive wastes,
little or no customary international law has crystallized to define the authority of
states to deal with these problems.").
107 See B. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 90 (1988)
(noting superseded rule of customary international law that the right to dispose of
waste materials in the high seas is a traditional freedom of the seas).
108 UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 87(2).
109 See supra note 84.
110 The London Dumping Convention's annex system of prohibition and
permitting is strong evidence of the presumption against pollution. The Convention
essentially engages in a determination of "reasonableness" in classifying pollutants.
See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
111M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 863 (1962).
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determine if the technology will remain safe for the many thousands
of years necessary to prevent harm to the environment. Again, the
legal analysis must turn entirely on technological evaluations. States
may plausibly argue the reasonableness issue either way, depending
on the science they choose to accept. A state that undertakes SSD
will no doubt consider it a reasonable use of the oceans, and thus
a high seas freedom. Thus, the requirement imposes little practical
limitations on SSD, unless the option is patently unsafe-in which
case the disposing state would most likely not attempt it anyway.
Related to the foregoing requirement is the evolving concept
that states have an obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment. Like the reasonableness requirement, there is little
debate that this duty has become a rule of customary international
law. l" 2 The rule has found its most concrete expression in part
XII of UNGLOS III, which expressly imposes the obligation on all
states and requires them to take measures "to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment."11 3 As UNCLOS III
here purports to be codifying customary law, 114 the same observa-
tions made in the previous discussion of UNCLOS III's obligations
apply equally to this analysis: 115 most of the marine protection
provisions are advisory in nature; they rely on other international
forums for definition and implementation."16 The obligation's
genesis in customary law, however, is important because the rule is
binding on all states, even non-ratifiers of the Convention, and thus
may restrain unilateral action by states outside of the treaty regime.
112 See B. SMITH, supra note 107, at 94 (concluding that "[t]he overwhelming
opinion of contemporary authors appears in accord with the view that the obligation
to prevent material injury to the high seas environment has achieved customary legal
status"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 601 (1986). The Restatement provides:
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the
extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within
its jurisdiction or control...
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the
environment... of areas beyond the limits of nationaljurisdiction
Id.
11 UNCLOS III, supra note 20, art. 194(1).
114 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
116 See id.; see also Charney, The United States and The Law of the Sea After UNCLOS
Ill-The Impact of General International Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1983, at
37, 42.
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In the end, customary international law does not represent
much of a limitation on SSD. In the absence of a strong regulatory
regime, those states with an interest in carrying out an SSD initiative
will be able to do so, and will influence the development of
customary law to accommodate this result. De Visscher analogized
the growth of customary international law to the gradual formation
of a road across vacant land.117 While several directions initially
are followed, the majority of users begin to follow the same line
which becomes a single path. "Not long elapses before that path is
transformed into a road accepted as the only regular way .... "118
During this development, some make heavier footprints than others
because of their greater weight,
thus the more influential states... mark the way with more vigour
and tend to become the guarantors and defenders of the way
forward.... This follows from the nature of the international
system where all may participate but the views of those with
greater power carry greater weight.... Universality is not
required [to establish a new customary rule], but some correlation
with power is.119
In the SSD context, the major nuclear states are also those states
that leave heavy footprints.120 If a coalition develops among them
to begin SSD, that event will impact on the creation of customary
law, rather than vice versa. At best, customary international law will
require that SSD be carried out in the most environmentally sound
manner, and may limit unilateral action by those states either
outside of the LDC-UNCLOS III treaty regime, or who refuse to
comply with the LDC's non-binding ban on SSD.
117 See M. SHAW, supra note 106, at 65.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 65-67 (emphasis added).
120 The states that participated in the original NEA Seabed Working Group were
Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Moore,
supra note 40, at 118. Not coincidentally, nuclear power accounts for more than 25%
of electricity generated in four of these states: France,Japan, the Federal Republic
of Germany, and Canada. See id. at 121. States with nuclear weapon production
capability have an added incentive to pursue a seabed emplacement initiative. If all
or even several of these states decide to pursue seabed emplacement, it is difficult to
imagine any relevant rule of customary international law imposing serious constraints
on the undertaking.
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III. REGIME 121 DESIGN AND CREATION: MANAGED NUCLEAR
WASTE DISPOSAL IN THE OCEAN
The international response to seabed emplacement to date has
been inadequate. While certain governing principles are apparent,
the international status of SSD remains ambiguous. Evaluation of
the option has proceeded piecemeal, and has largely focused on
how SSD fits under existing organizational structures rather than
whether those systems are appropriate to the question. Such a legal
vacuum opens the door to unilateral or small group "reciprocal"
state action, and creates a lack of uniform technical standards.
Seabed emplacement is too important an issue to fall through the
interstices of international regulation: short of nuclear war, it is
potentially the most environmentally destructive endeavor undertak-
en by humankind, with the most irreparable and long-lived
consequences. Conversely, it might be the only feasible solution to
the immediate and seemingly intractable problem of high-level waste
disposal. This is not an issue like seabed mining, where the
international community enjoys the luxury of perfecting the ideal
regime far in advance of anticipated need. 122 The consequences
of either an international stalemate or a trial and error approach are
too serious.
A. The Need for a New Regime
One may legitimately question the need for the creation of yet
another regime to govern seabed emplacement. There are more
than 150 multilateral environmental conventions currently in force,
most recently negotiated and replete with their own complex
operational machinery. 123 Existing institutions already possess a
121 Professor Ernst Haas's definition of regime is highly relevant to the following
discussion:
Regimes are norms, procedures, and rules agreed to in order to regulate an issue-
area. Norms tell us why states collaborate; rules tell us what substantively
speaking, the collaboration is about; procedures answer the question of how
the collaboration is to be carried out. Procedures, therefore, involve the
choice of whether specific administrative arrangements should be set up to
regulate the issue area. Administration involves organization.
Haas, Why Collaborate? Issue-Linhage and International Regimes, 32 WORLD POL. 357,
397 (1980).
122 As noted, international development of the International Seabed Authority has
taken enormous amounts of diplomatic time and effort. The economic viability of
its raison d'Etre, seabed mining, is still decades in the future.
123 See von Moltke, International Commissions and Implementation of International
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measure of legitimacy, based upon a pre-existing mandate. 124
They sometimes have considerable power which can be brought to
bear on a given environmental problem.1 25 However, no existing
regime has a sufficiently clear mandate or appropriate operational
philosophy to manage SSD.
There are at least nine organizations that may claim to regulate
some or all of seabed emplacement activities. 126 As one observer
noted, "[alt the global level interorganizational conflicts over
program priorities and possibilities for task expansion are endemic
because the funds to support international collaboration are small,
sunk costs are great, and executive heads perceive themselves being
caught in a zero sum game." 127  SSD impacts on a very large
number of international concerns. There is a high potential for
conflict when several organizations, each with its own agenda and
constituency, attempt to exert a measure of control over SSD. "Turf
wars" of this sort tend to undermine legitimacy and destroy
consensus. No coherent regulatory structure will likely emerge from
this disarray.
As was shown in Part II, even organizations whose mandate
appears strongest in this area have been unable to formulate a
satisfactory approach to the emplacement issue. The LDC debates
have produced little of substance. The Convention's consideration
has been limited to legalistic "yes or no" interpretation, and
underlying political considerations, rather than solid scientific
evidence, have motivated many of the members' positions. Perhaps
more distressing is that the bodies responsible for the LDG's crucial
Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 87, 89 (J. Carroll
ed. 1988).
124 See id. at 88.
125 Id.
126 The potential players in an SSD regime might include:
1. The signatories to the London Convention
2. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
3. The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)
4. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
5. The interorganizational Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of
Marine Pollution (GESAMP)
6. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)
7. The World Health Organization (WHO)
8. The International Seabed Authority (ISA)-if UNCLOS III enters into
force.
9. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD.
See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 90.
127 Id. at 89.
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scientific advice and management, the NEA and the LAEA, have very
limited goals and perspectives. Generally, they treat cooperative
waste management as "a problem that inhibits nuclear energy
development." 28 The IAEA's usual activity in nuclear safety and
environmental concerns is limited to preparing various codes and
guides, rather than active leadership of the kind necessary for a
subseabed regime. Further, one observer has noted the apparent
NEA attitude that "it does not really matter if each country
establishes its own criteria and standards for radioactive waste
management without international oversight." 129  Such qualities
make these organizations poor foundations for an international SSD
management regime. Near total revision of their roles would be a
prerequisite for possible service in that capacity. A new regime with
a clear mandate and appropriate operative philosophy is imperative.
B. General Concerns for the New Regime
The touchstone of any appropriate SSD regime will be its ability
to evaluate and implement the appropriate technology. Nuclear
waste disposal is unique among global environmental problems
because of its inherent permanence: decisions made in the next
decade will affect mankind for at least 10,000 years, and perhaps up
to a million years. 130  Unlike oil spills and other transboundary
environmental problems that are adequately regulated with
comprehensive liability schemes, seabed emplacement-or any
permanent HLW disposal itechnology-must work correctly the first
time, and remain functioning for a time span even longer than
history has been recorded. Thus, it is impossible to rely on a form
of ongoing oversight to protect the environment: the waste
elements will outlast even our most permanent institutional
128 D. DEESE, supra note 13, at 162.
129 Id.
130 To secure Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval, the Yucca mountain
terrestrial repository must be designed to achieve complete isolation from the
biosphere for at least 10,000 years. See supra text accompanying note 11. The former
chairman of the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management of the National
Academy ofSciences stated that "[h]igh-level nuclear wastes are extremely toxic, with
some fission product radionuclides having effective lifetimes of more than a million
years." Frosch, Disposing of High.Level Radioactive Waste, 20 OCEANUS 5, 5 (1977).
Another expert agrees that "[t]he level of radioactivity and rate of decay of the full
suite of elements is such that the waste elements must not be allowed to escape from
the seabed for a million years." Silva, Physical Processes in Deep-Sea Clays, 20 OCEANUS
31, 31 (1977).
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arrangements. As an example, planners at Yucca mountain are
finding it difficult to devise a way to warn generations far in the
future of the site, as no language has lasted even close to the time
period needed. 131  Engineering and siting permanent warning
signs is itself a serious challenge. 3 2 Nation-states, and even more
ephemeral international organizations, cannot be relied upon to
"manage" SSD's environmental risk in the traditional sense.
Instead, the technology must be self-regulating; any system must be
designed to isolate waste without relying for its effectiveness on
human supervision and intervention.
133
1. Involving the Appropriate Actors
The new regime must focus on developing, selecting, and
implementing the right technology. This entails the establishment
of a treaty regime among interested states that vests power in the
relevant technical elites, rather than in the traditional hands of
diplomats and lawyers. Deferring to scientists in such a major way
would be a first in international environmental problem-solving, but
is crucial in the SSD context if the process is to remain as depoliti-
cized as possible. One self-proclaimed "neo-functionalist" commen-
tator has pointed to the involvement of such actors as a primary
factor in the success or failure of international environmental
agreements:
It is virtually impossible to make an effective contribution to marine
pollution treaty-making without possessing ... a sophisticated
understanding of the technologies related to the problem of
marine pollution and to the alternative solutions available ....
One would wish to back "los tecnicos" in their constant, if
understated, struggle with "los politicos" ....
[S]uccess in marine pollution diplomacy depends essentially on
the political skills of the appropriate technical elites. 3 4
At bottom, SSD is a technical/engineering problem. If the
technical elites are in agreement that emplacement not only
represents the best HLW disposal option available, but also poses
an inconsequential environmental risk, SSD would be considered
131 See Burial Place, supra note 4, at C12.
132 See id.
133 In contrast, terrestrial disposal is labor intensive, requiring elaborate
monitoring and constant security for the life of the facility. See id. at C1.
1
3 4 Johnston, Marine Pollution Agreements: Successes and Problems, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY, supra note 123, at 199, 204-05.
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"legal" under any of the sources of law analyzed above.1 35 Con-
versely, if there is either widespread disagreement or agreement
that SSD is not a safe option, the law will follow this technical
determination. In any event, the scientific evaluation will form the
basis for the legal result. ][n practice, the important decision makers
in the new SSD regime would be an international group of scientists
entrusted by the member states with evaluating SSD at all stages of
its development and impllementation.
C. Depoliticization. and Simplicity
There are additional advantages to delegation of front-line
authority to technical elites. The dialogue will focus appropriately
on scientific analysis, with disputes largely resolvable empirically.
Scientific controversies may be settled by resort to further experi-
mentation. Given time and money, a consensus will usually emerge
on issues such as the feasibility of a particular technology or the
functioning of an ecosystem. In contrast, political disputes between
nations depend more for their resolution on power relationships
than on objective evaluations. Indeed, several recent attempts at
regime creation have failed because a priori political/legal battles
have resulted in intractable polarization-extremists either refused
to compromise, 136 or forced an unworkable compromise.1
3 7
135 If it will not harm the marine environment, SSD should be beyond the scope
of the LDC and UNCLOS III, and certainly should be considered a reasonable use
of the seas under customary international law. Any remaining challenges would be
based upon emotional/philosophical/moral objections to the use of the oceans for
the disposal of radioactive waste. See e.g., E. BORGHESE, THE DRAMA OF THE OCEANS
213 (1975) (arguing that while the oceans may be the safest place on Earth to dispose
of the wastes, even a small risk of harm makes disposal untenable); Comment, The
Need for a Ban on All Radioactive Waste Disposal in the Ocean, 7 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus.
803 (1986) (arguing for a ban on SSD on the basis of Professor Edith Brown-Weiss's
"Planetary Trust" doctrine, which argues that the human species holds the natural
resources of the planet in trust for all future generations).
136A proposed international agreement settinglimits on exploitation ofAntarctic
resources was recently scuttled by two nations that took a maximalist environmental
position, refusing to allow any commercial activity whatsoever in Antarctica. See
Browne, France and Australia Kill Pact on Limited Antarctic Mining and Oil Drilling,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at A20, col 1. Most nations shared the view of the U.S.
State Department that "[i]t is better to have regulated exploitation than a legal
vacuum in which no restraints of any kind are imposed on even the most environmen-
tally hazardous exploitation." Id.
137 The International Seabed Authority created by UNCLOS III came into being
as a concession to third world nations. See Malone, supra note 76, at 32 (stating that
the ISA "would have been given the unprecedented power to redistribute wealth on
an international scale").
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Such factionalization tends to produce regimes that are weighted
down with an all-encompassing agenda that therefore fail to
accomplish even their primary mission. A salient example is the
International Seabed Authority created under UNCLOS III, which
attempts to carry out a controversial political agenda while regulat-
ing deep sea mineral recovery. I 8 Many industrialized nations
have rejected UNGLOS III solely on the basis of the political
implications of the seabed mining regime, placing the entire treaty
in jeopardy.
Initial focus on or expansion into political issues would similarly
serve as an anchor for a new SSD regime. A technical focus would
tend to narrow the issues presented by SSD, increasing the chances




In the face of growing instability in the supply and price of
fossil fuels, rapidly dwindling temporary storage capacity for high-
level nuclear waste, and the complete lack of viable disposal
alternatives, the realistic question is not whether some form of SSD
will take place, but rather under what international regulatory
regime. Thus far, international consideration of the option has
been legalistic and, from a global environmental perspective,
unidimensional.
There has been a failure to recognize that nuclear waste disposal
is more than merely a national problem. If one nation disposes of
its waste improperly, the resulting catastrophe will eventually impact
upon future generations, whether disposal takes place within
1s8 See Dubs, Minerals of the Deep Sea: Myth and Reality, in Pontecorvo, supra note
76, at 85, 111-17 (detailing the genesis of the ISA and controversial nature of third
world claims to the seabed). In an excellent example of the polarization of the ISA
debate, Malone notes that ISA and its theoretical underpinnings are
a guise under which the seabed's wealth was to be governed, regulated, and
allocated under the false assumption that every nation has an undivided
property interest in the deep seabed, and... is automatically entitled to its
proportionate share of the fruits from those whose efforts produce wealth
The [ISA] would have been given the unprecedented power to
redistribute wealth on an international scale.
Malone, supra note 76, at 32.
139 See E. MILES, supra note 21, at 86 ("With respect to issues on an international
regime agenda... the narrower the scope of issues ... the higher the degree of
certainty about efficient solutions because benefits and cost can be calculated fairly
reliably. .. ").
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national borders or in the global commons. More than twenty-five
nations now generate significant quantities of nuclear waste; 140 no
nation has yet come close to finding a permanent solution to the
disposal problem. In this respect, SSD is analogous to other
pressing transboundary environmental problems, from global
warming to ozone depletion. The solution to such issues will
depend on unified action by the international community. Creation
of a regime to address the questions presented by SSD may serve as
a useful test case. To the extent it is possible to de-politicize the
SSD regime, to make sound determinations about appropriate
technology, and to bind all relevant state actors, one may be
optimistic about the ability to address future transboundary issues.
As one report on global environmental prospects recently
lamented, "[t]he Earth is one but the world is not."14 1 Perhaps
the creation of a viable subseabed emplacement regime would bring
humankind one step closer to unifying the two.
140 See Moore, supra note 40, at 121.
141 WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEv., OUR COMMON FuTuRE 27 (1987).
